University of Washington School of Law

UW Law Digital Commons
Articles

Faculty Publications

2013

Governance of Global Mobile Money Networks:
The Role of Technical Standards in Mobile Money
in Developing Countries
Jane K. Winn
University of Washington School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jane K. Winn, Governance of Global Mobile Money Networks: The Role of Technical Standards in Mobile Money in Developing Countries, 8
Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 197 (2013), https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/157

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS
VOLUME 8, ISSUE 3 MOBILE MONEY SYMPOSIUM 2013

GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL MOBILE MONEY NETWORKS:
THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL STANDARDS
Jane K. Winn *
© Jane K. Winn

Cite as: 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 197 (2013)
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1197

ABSTRACT
Mobile money has the potential to be an effective policy
instrument for financial inclusion in developing countries,
but it also has the potential to fuel money laundering and
terrorist financing. The 2012 revised Financial Action Task
Force standards attempt to strike a workable balance
between the goals of financial inclusion and financial
integrity in developing countries. Mobile money schemes
are mostly based in national markets, however, and are not
normally designed to address the need of poor migrants for
cheap, effective cross-border remittance services. Demand
for such cross-border remittance services may drive the
development of technical standards to build global markets
from national ones. As in other global governance contexts,
regulatory competition among both developed and
developing countries is likely to arise, and be shaped by
network externalities, the economics of platform markets,
and new governance institutions as well as national
government strategies. If such standard-setting efforts treat
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This research was funded by University of Washington Royalty Research Fund
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compliance with AML/CTF as requirements, then the
growth of global networks might promote both inclusion
and the development of “integrity by design” in global
mobile money technologies. Co-regulatory mechanisms
already in place in the United States and European Union
for managing the interface between technical standards
and legislation might provide some helpful models for
accomplishing this. Ensuring that the governance of global
mobile money networks is effective, legitimate, and
accountable from the perspective of stakeholders in both
developed and developing economies will be difficult,
however.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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“This notion of standards, as boring as it is, is really the
plumbing of the Internet economy,” Thibeau said. “It turns out that
you can only go so far . . . until you come up with standards.
Standards build markets. Standards help the pie grow bigger.” 1
INTRODUCTION
Globalization integrates what once appeared to be separate
national markets, creating new challenges and opportunities in its
1

Mark Milian, Will a Standardized System for Verifying Web Identity Ever
Catch on?, CNN (Feb. 15, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/15/tech/web/
government-online-id/index.html (quoting Don Thibeau, the executive chairman
for the OpenID Foundation).

2013]

GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL MOBILE MONEY NETWORKS

199

wake. Opportunities spawned by globalization are not exclusively
for the wealthy and educated in developed countries: the volume of
migration by the world’s poor seeking a better life has also grown
enormously in recent decades. 2 Even when the poorest economic
migrants enjoy modest success, however, they face another
challenge: finding safe, inexpensive ways to send relatively small
amounts of money back home. If they have migrated within a
country that has a robust domestic remittance system, then this
challenge is easily overcome. But most poor migrants live in
countries that have made little progress in financial inclusion, or
have migrated abroad and so must find a cross-border remittance
mechanism. 3
This Article was written for a conference examining the impact
of financial inclusion and financial integrity strategies on the
growth of mobile money services in developing countries. 4 In this
Article, “mobile money” refers to mobile financial services
generally, including mobile payments and mobile banking. 5 As a
2

“There are far more international migrants in the world today than ever
previously recorded, and their number has increased rapidly in the last few
decades…[in 2000, there were an estimated 150 million migrants; in 2010, there
were an estimated 214 million].” INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, WORLD
MIGRATION REPORT 2010, THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION: BUILDING CAPACITIES
FOR CHANGE 3 (2010).
3
Jake Kendall, The Poor Need Better Payment Services, CONSULTATIVE
GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR (CGAP) (Dec.7, 2011), http://www.cgap.org/
blog/poor-need-better-payment-services.
4
The proceedings of the conference were published in January 2013 as
special issue of the WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS,
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wjtla.
5
There is no generally accepted definition of “mobile money,” but the
definition used in this Article has been used in other contexts. See generally
Janine Firpo, E-Money–Mobile Money–Mobile Banking–What’s the Difference?,
BLOGS.WORLDBANK.ORG (Jan. 21, 2009), http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/emoney-mobile-money-mobile-banking-what-s-the-difference; PIERRE-LAURENT
CHATAIN, ANDREW ZERZAN, WAMEEK NOOR, NAJAH DANNAOUI & LOUIS DE
KOKER, PROTECTING MOBILE MONEY AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIMES xxvii (2011)
(mobile money “refers to a financial service in which customers send and
receive monetary value via a mobile phone. This includes retail payments and
remittances from one person to another or between businesses. Salary and
benefit distributions into mobile-linked accounts are also encountered in some
countries. M-money accounts can be provided by many types of institutions,
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result of the success of mobile payment schemes in countries such
as Kenya 6 and the Philippines, mobile money has emerged as a
game-changing strategy for financial inclusion in developing
countries. 7 For the purposes of this Article, financial inclusion is
defined as “. . . a state in which all people of working age have
access to a full suite of quality financial services that includes
payment services, savings, credit, and insurance. These services
are provided at affordable prices, in a convenient manner, and with
dignity for the clients.”8 In 2009, the World Bank estimated that
the unbanked population of the world was 2.7 billion, or 70 percent
of the adult population in the developing world. 9 Financial
inclusion has been shown to increase economic growth, reduce
income inequality and help alleviate poverty for this population. 10
In this Article, “financial integrity” refers to controls over
financial services that support anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing as well as conventional control objectives
including disclosure to investors and management decisionmaking. Although compliance with international anti-money
including banks and nonbanks, such as mobile network operators and payment
system providers. The category of services includes transaction-enabling
services, such as domestic or international person-to-person funds transfers or
mobile-based payment services. M-money services are part of the retail payment
industry and are covered by the national payment system oversight policy.”).
6
Mercy W. Buku & Michael W. Meredith, Safaricom and M-PESA in
Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS
375 (2013).
7
George B. Radics, Development and Mobile-Banking in the Philippines
(2011) (unpublished draft) (on file with author).
8
CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION AT ACCION INT’L, MEXICO’S PROSPECTS FOR
FULL FINANCIAL INCLUSION: A WHITE PAPER FROM THE FINANCIAL INCLUSION
2020 PROJECT 4 (2009), available at http://centerforfinancialinclusionblog.files
.wordpress.com/2011/10/mexicos-prospects-for-full-financial-inclusionenglish.pdf.
9
JAKE KENDALL, NATALIYA MYLENKO & ALEJANDRO PONCE, MEASURING
FINANCIAL ACCESS AROUND THE WORLD 25 (CGAP Policy Research Working
Paper
No.
5253,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cgap.org/
sites/default/files/CGAP-Measuring-Financial-Access-around-the-World-Mar2010.pdf.
10
WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL? POLICIES AND PITFALLS IN EXPANDING
ACCESS 28 (2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099583-1194373512632/FFA_book.pdf.
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laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) guidelines
has been seen as a barrier to the use of mobile money for financial
inclusion in other developing countries, the 2012 revisions to
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) AML/CTF guidelines reflect
efforts to address these concerns. 11 In developing countries,
AML/CTF policies may sometimes appear to be dictated by
external stakeholders, while safety and soundness concerns
including the management of operational risks may appear to be
more within the purview of national regulators. 12 This Article will
focus on those areas of financial market regulation conducted by
national regulatory authorities where the two different strategies
overlap, while conceding that there may be significant areas where
they do not overlap or may even be at odds with each other. 13
To date, most efforts to promote the development of mobile
money as a financial inclusion strategy have centered on national
markets. As adoption rates grow for mobile money within national
markets in developing countries, increased attention will turn to the
possible use of mobile money for cross-border remittances. 14
11

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION:
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS (2012) [hereinafter 2012 FATF
RECOMMENDATIONS],
available
at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%20(approved
%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May%202012%20web%20version.pdf.
12
Rainer Hülsse, Even Clubs Can’t Do Without Legitimacy: Why the AntiMoney Laundering Blacklist Was Suspended, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 459
(2008); Claire Alexandre, Ignacio Mas & Daniel Radcliffe, Regulating New
Banking Models to Bring Financial Services to All, 54 CHALLENGE 116 (2011).
13
Exploring possible conflicts between FATF Guidelines and national
financial services regulatory objectives is beyond the scope of this Article. On
potential conflicts between transnational anti-money laundering efforts and
national regulatory objectives, see generally Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War
Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money
Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 503 (2011);
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State
Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 15
(2004).
14
DALBERG GLOBAL DEV. ADVISORS, CGAP LANDSCAPE STUDY ON
INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES THROUGH MOBILE MONEY (2012), available at
http://www.gsma.com/developmentfund/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/
2012landscapestudyoninternationalremittancesthroughmobilemoney.pdf.
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Demand for such cross-border remittance services will fuel
demand for the development of a global mobile money network
architecture based on a wide range of different types of
“standards.” 15 In English, the word “standard” can refer to a
bewildering array of different things, however. 16 In U.S. legal
academic writing, a “standard” may refer to regulatory guidance or
an open-ended principle contained in judicial precedent as opposed
to a formal legal rule. 17 In social science or policy analysis, it
might be a reference to “normative standards and advisory
guidance” issued by “private regulators.” 18 In engineering,
“standard” may refer to measurement standards, product and
process standards, management standards, or interoperability
standards. 19 In this Article, the term “technical standard” will
generally be used to refer to engineering standards, while the term
15

Glenbrook Partners, Visa, GSMA to Partner for Secure Mobile Money
NEWS
(Feb.
18,
2009),
Services
Globally,
PAYMENTS
http://www.paymentsnews.com/2009/02/visa-gsma-to-partner-for-securemobile-financial-services-globally.html; NEIL DALY, GSMA INTERNATIONAL
REMITTANCE SERVICE PROVIDERS : AN OVERVIEW OF MOBILE INTERNATIONAL
REMITTANCE SERVICE PROVIDER SERVICE OFFERINGS (2010), available at
http://www.gsma.com/developmentfund/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/
gsmaremittanceserviceproviderwhitepaper182.pdf; Jennifer Schenker, Mobile
Money: Can Visa and Its Partners Help the Operators Stay in the Game?
INFORMILO (Feb. 26, 2012), http://www.informilo.com/20120226/mobilemoney-can-visa-and-its-partners-help-operators-stay-game-536.
16
For example, the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY online version
recognized 28 separate meanings for “standard” as a noun (rather than an
adjective or verb), with numerous sub-classifications within each of those 28
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
meanings.
Standard
Definition,
OXFORD
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/188962?rskey=w0q1fc&result=1#eid
(last
visited Sept. 16, 2012).
17
See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
18
CGAP, GLOBAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION
FOR THE POOR: TOWARD PROPORTIONATE STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE 1 (2011)
(discussing “normative standards and advisory guidance”); TIM BÜTHE &
WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 126-161 (2011) (discussing “private
regulators”).
19
CRAIG N. MURPHY & JOANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO): GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH
VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS (2009).
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“standard” without qualification will generally refer to legal and
political norms.
The architecture of global markets is increasingly defined by
information and communication technology (ICT) interoperability
standards. This is because in recent decades, business
administration has migrated from traditional bureaucracies and
paper communications to network organizations linked by
computers. The rise of ICT networks as the backbone of economic
organization together with decades of trade liberalization are major
factors contributing to the rise of global markets from what were
once geographically remote local markets. Technical
interoperability can be achieved in a wide variety of ways,
including proprietary technologies that operate as de facto
standards such as the Microsoft Windows operating system.
Technical interoperability can also be achieved through open,
collaborative processes such as open source software development
or public standard-setting processes such as those conducted under
the auspices of the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) or the Internet Engineering Task Force. Governance of
technical standard-setting processes and managing the “interface”
between national laws and technical standards are fundamental
tasks that must be accomplished in order for any global market to
function at an operational level. 20 Interface here is used a metaphor
for a “regulatory tool” or “mechanism choice.” 21 When ICT
networks operate in both developing and developed countries
simultaneously, these governance and management challenges
become even more complex and difficult. 22
Different national governments respond to the challenges of
20

See generally Jane K. Winn, Globalization and Standards: The Logic of
Two-Level Games, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 185 (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415424.
21
See generally Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and Tools of
Public Action: An Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO
THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Jonathan B. Weiner &
Barak D. Richman, Mechanism Choice, in DANIEL A. FARBER & ANNE JOSEPH
O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 363
(2010).
22
See, e.g., Howard Williams, Internet Governance: Exploring the
Development Link, 58 COMM. & STRATEGIES 81 (2005); CGAP, supra note 18.
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globalization in different ways because they take their institutional
endowments and local political and economic culture into account
when designing strategies. In the “varieties of capitalism”
approach developed by Hall and Soskice, some countries can be
identified as “liberal market economies” (LMEs) and others
identified as “coordinated market economies” (CMEs). 23 The most
noteworthy LMEs include the United States, the United Kingdom.,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, while Germany, France and
Japan are noteworthy examples of CMEs. In the context of mobile
money as a financial inclusion and financial integrity strategy, the
general LME/CME distinction might also be applied to the
political economy of developing countries: Kenya seems to be a
“developing country LME” while India seems to be a “developing
country CME.” As a global network architecture for mobile money
begins to emerge, distinct regulatory competition strategies may
also emerge for developed LME, developed CME, developing
LME and developing CME countries. As in all global markets
defined by ICT networks, however, national regulatory
competition strategies may be affected by economic variables such
as strong network effects or the emergence of platform markets. 24
The 2012 FATF Guidelines strengthened the “Risk-Based
Approach” to AML/CTF compliance efforts by making it
mandatory rather than optional. 25 Regulators in developing
countries will need more sophisticated tools than most now possess
to demonstrate their compliance with this expanded Risk-Based
Approach mandate. One common benefit of technical standards is
reducing barriers to the diffusion of innovations. Although
attention in mobile money standard-setting efforts is currently
focused primarily on reducing barriers to its adoption,
standardization efforts could also be focused on reducing the cost
23

Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of
Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
24
See infra Section III, Standards, Networks, and Platforms for further
discussion of network effects and platform markets.
25
2012 FATF GUIDELINES, supra note 11 at Recommendation 1; see
generally Louis de Koker, The 2012 Revised FATF Recommendations:
Assessing and Mitigating Mobile Money Integrity Risks Within the New
Standards Framework, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 165 (2013).
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of demonstrating compliance with guidelines. With regard to
computer security generally, it is now proverbial that “[s]ecurity is
best baked in to the network, not bolted on later.” 26 With regard to
information privacy, an analogous concept is known as “Privacy
by Design.” 27 If technical standards for mobile money could be
used to promote financial inclusion and reduce compliance costs
simultaneously, such a result might be labeled “Integrity by
Design.” Unless AML/CTF compliance issues are included in the
scope of mobile money standard-setting activities, however, such a
result is very unlikely, given the current security issues in the ICT
networks of many developing countries. 28 The flood of computer
security and information privacy problems currently facing
developed countries as a result of underinvestment in security in
the past and the difficulty of retrofitting effective security and
privacy functions onto existing systems suggests what the costs
might be of postponing AML/CTF compliance considerations in
the global mobile money context. 29
Ensuring that the governance of global mobile money networks
is effective, legitimate, and accountable from the perspective of
stakeholders in both developed and developing economies will be
difficult. 30 The calculus of consensus building regarding
26

Cisco, Cisco Systems Security—About, FACEBOOK (Oct 1, 2008),
www.facebook.com/ciscosecurity/info; Henry Kenyon, DOD CIO Outlines
Challenges: Handling Threats, New Tech with Shrinking Budgets, GOV’T
COMPUTER NEWS (Oct. 24, 2011), http://gcn.com/articles/2011/10/24/dod-ciooutlines-challenges-facing-military-networks.aspx.
27
ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 1 (2009), available at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/privacybydesign.pdf; see generally Ira
S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409
(2011).
28
See generally Andrew Harris, Seymour Goodman, & Patrick Traynor,
Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money Applications in
Africa, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 245 (2013).
29
See generally Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification
Laws Possible?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416222.
30
See generally Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin & Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel,
Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: Framing the Issue in an Interdisciplinary
Fashion, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 1 (Anne Peters, Lucy
Koechlin & Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel eds., 2009); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
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technology governance in the global information economy is
complex and uncertain under the best of circumstances. 31 If the
shortest route to bringing technological innovations to market is
adopted to achieve financial inclusion goals, the result may be the
inadvertent creation of barriers to efficient compliance with
AML/CTF mandates. But if technological innovation is required to
take a back seat to the integration of compliance functions, then
financial inclusion may suffer. If participation in governance is
conditioned on technological sophistication and familiarity with
global ICT standard-setting processes, then many developing
country stakeholders will be disenfranchised. But if ICT technical
standard-setting processes become too politicized, then the
standards they produce may fail to achieve any market adoption at
all. Some resolution of these issues will be necessary in order for a
global mobile remittance network to succeed politically as well as
economically.
I. GLOBALIZATION, MIGRATION, AND REMITTANCES
Although the term “globalization” only came into widespread
use during the 1990s, the current wave of economic globalization
is not the first. 32 The first wave of globalization occurred between
1870 and 1914, even though it was not given that label at the time.
Although trade in goods increased, the hallmark of this first
globalization was the mass migration of as much as 10 percent of
the world’s population over this period. The scale of this migration
has never been seen before or since. It was halted by the outbreak
of World War I and law reforms during the interwar years intended
to restrict immigration from the Old World in Europe and Asia to
the New World of North and South America.
Kirsch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
31
The failure of the Open Systems Interconnection project illustrates well
the fragility such projects. See generally Andrew L Russell, “Rough Consensus
and Running Code” and the Internet-OSI Standards War, IEEE ANNALS HIST.
COMPUTING, July-Sept. 2006, at 48.
32
SUZANNE BERGER, HOW WE COMPETE: WHAT COMPANIES AROUND THE
WORLD ARE DOING TO MAKE IT IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005).
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The second wave of globalization occurred between 1950 and
1973, and was ushered in by trade liberalization policies and
technological innovations such as the containerization of shipping.
This wave of globalization consisted largely of increased volume
of trade in goods. Migration was modest in scope and involved as
much migration of professionals out of developed countries to
developing countries as workers from developing countries to
developed ones.
The third wave of globalization began in 1974 and continues
through today. 33 Migration is again accelerating, with hundreds of
millions leaving developing countries in pursuit of economic
opportunity, at the same time that trade in goods continues to
increase. Although the absolute numbers of migrants may be
unprecedented, the current rate of migration affects only a tiny
percentage of world population.
Economic migrants send home remittances, so the global
market for remittances has grown together with migration.
According to official estimates, the equivalent of US$440 billion in
remittances was sent in 2010, although the actual volume of
remittances is probably much higher. 34 Of this amount,
approximately US$325 billion or roughly 75 percent was sent to
developing countries. The total volume of remittance flows to
many developing countries dwarfs direct foreign investment and
foreign aid payments, and may equal 25 percent or more of GDP in
some developing countries. 35
Economic migrants from developing countries often send
relatively small amounts of money. Relative to the amount being
transferred, remittance fees are often very high, averaging 10
percent of the principal transmitted. 36 As a result, many migrants
rely on informal remittance systems. Informal remittance services
33

Globalization: Three Waves of Change, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/11751235.
34
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., MAXIMIZING THE DEVELOPMENT
IMPACT OF REMITTANCES 25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2011/8 (2012),
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctncd2011d8_en.pdf.
35
Id.
36
Dilip Ratha, Remittances: Funds for the Folks Back Home, IMF FIN. &
DEV. (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/
remitt.htm.
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offer fertile ground for money laundering and terrorist financing. If
migrants were provided access to inexpensive, efficient remittance
services, this could promote increased financial inclusion and
financial integrity at the same time.
II. MOBILE MONEY: FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND FINANCIAL
INTEGRITY
“Financial deepening” has long been understood to play an
important role in the development process:
Economists have long contemplated the nature of
complex links between financial development and
economic growth . . . . Since the early 1990s, a
growing body of [work by economists] has
provided strong theoretical and empirical support
for the hypothesis that financial development fosters
economic growth. 37
In developing countries, widely disparate access to modern
financial institutions and the persistence of traditional sources of
finance, often create barriers to financial deepening and economic
development:
A developed financial system broadens access to
funds; conversely, in an underdeveloped financial
system, access to funds is limited and people are
constrained by the availability of their own funds
and have to resort to high cost informal sources
such as money lenders. Lower the availability of
funds and [increase] their cost, fewer would be the
economic activities that can be financed and hence
lower the resulting economic growth. 38
37

Nader Nazmi, Deregulation, Financial Deepening and Economic
Growth: The Case of Latin America, 45 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 447, 447-48
(2005).
38
Dr. Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India,
Address at the 2006 Annual Bankers’ Conference, Economic Growth, Financial
Deepening and Financial Inclusion (Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.bis.org/
review/r061121e.pdf.

2013]

GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL MOBILE MONEY NETWORKS

209

The idea of finding ways to provide banking services to the poor in
developing countries slowly began to gain momentum during the
1990s. 39
In 1999, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
estimated that half of the six billion people that then constituted the
world’s population had never even made or received a telephone
call. 40 Around the same time that observation was offered,
liberalization of telecommunications markets in the wake of the
WTO telecom agreement was triggering a communications
revolution in many developing countries. 41 The entry of China into
handset and telephone switching equipment markets also helped to
fuel the growth of mobile communications in developing countries
by reducing equipment prices. 42 Because telephones were not a
major platform for the delivery of financial services in any country
in the world during the 1990s, the connection between telephones
and financial inclusion was not obvious to anyone at the time.
During the 2000s, however, the sudden diffusion of mobile
communications in developing countries emerged as the deus ex
machina which unexpectedly made many financial inclusion
problems look less intractable. As The Economist pointed out, “In
places with bad roads, unreliable postal services, few trains and
parlous landlines, mobile phones can substitute for travel, allow
quicker and easier access to information on prices, enable traders

39

JOHN CONROY, JAMIE BEDSON & NINA NAYAR, BANKING WITH THE POOR
NETWORK: A HISTORY OF ASIA’S REGIONAL MICROFINANCE NETWORK 19902010
(2001),
available
at
http://www.fdc.org.au/data/
BWTP_Corporate_History.pdf.
40
Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Opening Address at the ITU
Telecom Opening Ceremony, ITU: Committed to Connecting the World, (Oct.
9, 1999), quoted in Clay Shirky, Half the World, CLAY SHIRKY’S WRITINGS
ABOUT THE INTERNET (June 30, 2002), http://shirky.com/writings/
herecomeseverybody/half_the_world_old.html.
41
Peter Cowhey & Mikhail M. Klimenko, The WTO Agreement and
Telecommunications Policy Reform (World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 2601, 2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Cowhey_Klimenko1.pdf.
42
See generally ERIC HARWIT, CHINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REVOLUTION (2008).
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to reach wider markets, boost entrepreneurship and generally make
it easier to do business.” 43
The success of some early mobile payments schemes in
Kenya, 44 South Africa 45 and the Philippines 46 helped to bring the
issue of AML/CTF compliance for mobile payments into focus.
The first international treaty to recognize the connection between
national anti-money laundering efforts and the control of
international crime was the 1988 United Nations Convention on
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.47
In 1989, the FATF was established at the initiative of what were
then known as the G7 nations following the adoption by the United
Nations General Assembly of a universal pledge to halt money
laundering. 48 Membership of the FATF started with 16 countries,
and over the years gradually expanded to the current 36 members,
including 34 countries and 2 regional organizations; international
organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) are observers. 49 Regional FATF-style bodies are
granted associate member status. In addition, nearly 150 other
countries have committed to compliance with FATF guidance even
though they are not members. In 1990, FATF issued a set of 40
Recommendations, and these were supplemented by Special
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing that it adopted in 2001.
The Recommendations were revised in 1996, 2003, and 2012. The
43

Ted Eytan, A Special Report on Telecoms in Emerging Markets: Mobile
Marvels, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.economist.com/
node/14483896.
44
Buku & Meredith, supra note 6.
45
Vivienne A. Lawack, Mobile Money, Financial Inclusion and Financial
Integrity: The South African Case, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 317 (2013).
46
Radics, supra note 7.
47
United Nations Convention on the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, art. 3-5, Dec. 20, 1988, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1582 U.N.T.S.
95 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1990).
48
NICOLAS RYDER, FINANCIAL CRIME IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LAW AND
POLICY 16 (2011) (The G7 nations included Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, United Kingdom, and United States).
49
History of the FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); FATF
Members and Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
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FATF is not a formal international organization established by a
treaty, but rather a very vigorous and surprisingly durable ad hoc
task force, although it also has the support of the United Nations. 50
Members of the FATF have committed to implement the
recommendations and agreed to be subject to multilateral
surveillance, peer review and the publication of the International
Cooperation Review Group list (formerly known as the Noncooperative Countries and Territories list). FATF works to ensure
compliance with its Guidelines by requiring member countries to
undertake an annual self-assessment, as well as mutual evaluations.
In 2000 and 2001, FATF published lists identifying 23 “noncooperating countries and territories” that it found were not trying
hard enough to fight against global money laundering. After a
country was “blacklisted”, FATF worked with its regulators to help
them bring their national regulatory systems into compliance with
its guidelines. The blacklist’s regulatory bite came from the fact
that FATF members in good standing were expected to take
“counter-measures” to protect their economies from the risks of
money laundering originating in blacklisted countries. 51 The
counter-measures required financial institutions in member states
to conduct enhanced customer due diligence before engaging in
financial transactions with any individuals or entities in blacklisted
countries. Given the expense of such enhanced due diligence, the
practical result of being placed on FATF’s blacklist was that the
volume of financial transactions into and out of a country could be
sharply restricted. The FATF blacklist turned out to be more
effective at getting the attention of “non-cooperating countries and
territories” than its sponsors may have anticipated which in turn
unleashed an intense backlash. 52 When the World Bank and IMF
50

S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON NONCOOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES 8 (2000), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Initial%20Report%20on
%20NCCTs%2002_2000.pdf; 2012 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11,
at Guideline 19.
52
Todd Doyle, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current
FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 279,
282 (2002) (“This development is disturbing and suggests a policy redolent of
extraterritorial bullying.”).
51
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joined the chorus of protests from developing countries about
FATF’s lack of transparency and due process in its enforcement
efforts, FATF backed off the blacklist strategy after only two
years. 53
As financial inclusion became a more prominent issue in the
development community, it did not take long for concerns to
emerge about what impact stringent AML/CTF requirements might
have on financial inclusion strategies in developing countries. 54 As
part of the move to Risk-Based Approach to compliance, FATF
published reports on how its Risk-Based Approach could be
applied to new payment methods including mobile money, 55 and
issued guidance on financial inclusion policies generally. 56
Whether these efforts by FATF are enough to counteract the
impression left from its use of the blacklist to coerce compliance,
however, remains unclear. In 2011, the Alliance for Financial
Inclusion produced for the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial
Inclusion a study of the impact of various global standard-setting
organizations, such as FATF and the Basel Committee, on
financial inclusion policies of five developing countries.
All [five] country case studies identified the FATF
as the [standard-setting body] with the most
significant impact on regulatory innovation in
relation to financial inclusion. The degree of impact
53

Hülsse, supra note 12.
JENNIFER ISERN, DAVID PORTEOUS, RAUL HERNANDEZ-COSS &
CHINYERE EGWUAGU, AML/CTF REGULATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL
SERVICE PROVIDERS THAT SERVE LOW-INCOME PEOPLE (2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/3965111146581427871/AML_implications_complete.pdf.
55
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS (2006),
available
at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Report
%20on%20New%20Payment%20Methods.pdf; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,
MONEY LAUNDERING USING NEW PAYMENT METHODS (2010), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20using%20New
%20Payment%20Methods.pdf.
56
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF GUIDANCE ON ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL
INCLUSION (2011), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/
images/AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf.
54
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is mainly driven by concerns regarding the
substantial penalties for non-compliance with the
FATF Recommendations. The FATF framework is
the only standards surveyed in this study with
significant punitive measures for non-compliant
jurisdictions, most notably the potential loss of
correspondent banking relationships. These punitive
measures may apply to members as well as nonmembers. Such penalties may have far-reaching
economic impacts on a non-compliant country if it
results in economic and financial isolation. As a
result, regulators are understandably hesitant to
adopt measures that may expose their countries to
reputational damage and the potential loss of
corresponding bank relationships. 57
With time, recognition by FATF member countries that financial
inclusion promotes the migration from the more opaque cash
economy to the more transparent formal economy may help to
ameliorate this legacy of mistrust and uncertainty in developing
countries. 58 The 2012 FATF Guidelines reflect the ongoing effort
of FATF member countries to emphasize the complementarity of
financial inclusion and financial integrity policies. 59
III. STANDARDS, NETWORKS, AND PLATFORMS
In financial markets, ICT standards play an important role in
increasing the “velocity” of assets by reducing transaction
processing times; increasing transparency for lenders, borrowers,
57

GLOBAL P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, GLOBAL STANDARD SETTING
BODIES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION: INSIGHTS AND LESSONS FROM FIVE
COUNTRIES: BRAZIL, KENYA, MEXICO, THE PHILIPPINES, AND SOUTH AFRICA 9
(2011),
available
at
http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/
Global%20Standard%20Setting%20Bodies%20and%20FI.pdf.
58
Peter Dittus & Michael Klein, On Harnessing the Potential of Financial
Inclusion 17 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 347, 2011),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work347.pdf.
59
See generally Claire Alexandre & Lynn Chang Eisenhart, Mobile Money
as an Engine of Financial Inclusion and Lynchpin of Financial Integrity, 8
WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 285 (2013).
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and regulators; reducing transaction costs; improving accuracy of
data processing; and reducing compliance monitoring costs for
both managers and regulators. 60 ICT standards are one type of
technical standard. Technical standards are documents that
establish engineering norms for products or processes. The
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has defined
standards as:
[A] document, established by consensus and
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or
characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at
the achievement of the optimum degree of order in
a given context[,] . . . based on the consolidated
results of science, technology and experience, and
aimed at the promotion of optimum community
benefits. 61
Formal standards are developed by standard-developing
organizations (SDOs) and are often a type of “public good.” Public
goods are goods that are non-rivalrous (meaning that consumption
by one person does not diminish the possibility of consumption by
another) and non-excludable (meaning that it is not possible to
prevent anyone from enjoying its use). Classic examples of public
goods include ideas, national defense or broadcast television.
Formal standards are often a particular type of public good known
as a “club good” which is non-rivalrous but exclusive. Classic
examples of club goods include telephone or cable television
networks. Formal standards are normally copyrighted by the
organization that produced them, and must be purchased by anyone
wishing to use them, so they do not normally qualify as pure public
60

Electronic Records and Signatures Association, Electronic Records and
Signature Update, June 5, 2008; Brian Williamson and Philliipa Marks,
Standardization in ICT : Current Economic Perspectives, in ICT SHAPING THE
WORLD: A SCIENTIFIC VIEW 199-200 (Gérard Pogorel & Michel Riquidel eds.,
2009).
61
Standards and Regulations—Definitions, ISO/IEC INFORMATION CENTRE
(June 20, 2011), http://www.standardsinfo.net/info/standards_regulations.html
(quoting INT’L STANDARDS ORG., ISO/IEC GUIDE 2:2004 STANDARDIZATION
th
AND RELATED ACTIVITIES—GENERAL VOCABULARY (8 ed. 2004)).
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goods. Formal or de jure standards may be contrasted with de facto
standards which emerge from practice but which may lack any
form of legal recognition. For example, the Microsoft Windows
operating system is a de facto standard for personal computer
software, but it is not a formal standard. 62 De facto standards may
function as both “private goods” (i.e., private property) and club
goods simultaneously.
From an economic perspective, public goods are often
problematic because there are usually insufficient market
incentives to produce them in the quantities required by the
public. 63 For example, a national highway system has many of the
characteristics of a public good. A government may choose to
make its national highway system non-excludable and pay for its
construction with government revenues, or it may permit a private
organization to build the highway and then exclude users who do
not pay tolls to recapture the costs of its construction. In the
absence of either government construction using tax revenues or a
license to operate a highway as a toll road, however, a national
highway system is unlikely to emerge because private parties
would normally have no incentive to build it.
Technical standards function as economic infrastructure that
reduces barriers to the dissemination of technological innovation,
and increases consumer welfare by ensuring technical
interoperability among products made by different producers. As
with other public goods, market forces alone may not produce the
optimal level or design of technical standards because private
parties may prefer to focus their attention on private goods for
market production. The economic benefits of proprietary
technologies may be concentrated on the owner of the technology
while their costs are spread over a large group of users, but with
standards, the benefits are spread over a large group of users while
the costs are concentrated on a smaller group of producers.
62

As a matter of national regulatory culture, regulators in LMEs such as the
United States are more willing to treat de facto standards as equivalent to formal
standards, while regulators in CMEs are more inclined to deny that they are
standards at all. That debate is outside the scope of this Article.
63
See generally TYLER COWEN, PUBLIC GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION (1991).
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Because they produce widespread benefits, the development and
promotion of technical standards are normally pivotal elements of
national industrial policy in developed market economies. 64 By
contrast, treating proprietary technologies as de facto standards
conflates the private nature of proprietary technologies and the
public nature of “standards” as that term is defined by ISO. 65
The governance framework for technical standard setting may
vary significantly between LMEs and CMEs, with LMEs favoring
a “bottom up” private sector driven approach while CMEs favor a
“top down” government orchestrated approach. Although issues
related to the governance of technical standard-setting processes
may be controversial, there is more of a consensus regarding the
costs and benefits of using standards. 66 The social and economic
benefits of standardization include:


Reducing costs through the simplification of complex
processes;



Reducing learning costs for new producers;



Allowing producers to exploit economies of scale;



Lowering transaction costs between transacting parties;



Promoting market information and confidence by signaling
product quality, or the compatibility of products or
components;



Reducing compliance costs; and



Increasing competition among producers, lowering prices
to consumers.

64

Jay Tate, National Varieties of Standardization, in VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM 442 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
65
Microsoft’s decision to convert its proprietary Word technology into a
standard in order to block competition from products based on the Open
Document Format standard was controversial for this reason. Jason Mick,
Microsoft Wins Document Format Standards Battle, DAILY TECH (Apr. 2,
2008),
http://www.dailytech.com/Microsoft+Wins+Document+Format+
Standards+Battle/article11338.htm.
66
See generally Michelle Egan, Setting Standards: Strategic Advantages in
International Trade, 13 BUS. STRATEGY REV. 51 (2002).
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However, the costs of standardization may also be substantial
and include:


Reducing product variety;



Imposing costs of achieving compliance with standards and
obtaining certification of compliance;



Imposing one-time switching costs for established products
to comply with subsequent standards; and



Increasing switching costs away from obsolete or suboptimal standards.

Formal public international standard-setting organizations that
may have jurisdiction over ICT technical standards include the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU); each of these
organizations has a formal, public counterpart in each country that
chooses to participate in them. While the processes used by these
global technical standard-setting organizations seek to be
transparent and inclusive, they may also be slow, bureaucratic, and
out of touch with conditions in the markets in which the standards
are to be implemented. 67
Technological change in markets for ICT products may be very
rapid, and because consumer demand for new ICT products often
depends on their interoperability with other ICT products, there is
also a need for rapid development of ICT standards. In order to
ensure that ICT standard development can keep pace with rapid
technological innovation in global ICT markets, new forms of
private international standard-developing organizations known as
“consortia” or “fora” have emerged in recent years. 68 These new
67

See generally Costas Andropoulos, Head of Unit, DG Enterprise and
Industry, ICT for Competitiveness and Innovation, Presentation at European
ICT Standardisation Policy at a Crossroads: A New Direction for Global
Success (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/
cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=3604.
68
See generally Jane K. Winn, US and EU Regulatory Competition and
Authentication Standards in Electronic Commerce, in NEW APPLICATIONS IN IT
STANDARDS 35 (Kai Jakobs ed., 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
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ICT SDOs range in size from a small handful of members working
closely together to thousands of members scattered around the
world collaborating by means of Internet communications. The
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), developer of the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) standard
which defines the Internet, and the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) are examples of large, informal ICT standard-developing
organizations with members around the world. By contrast,
EMVCo, the ICT SDO for the European EMV payments standard,
has only four members: American Express, JCB, MasterCard, and
Visa. Informal private ICT SDOs are often referred to as consortia,
and because they are generally exempt from regulation by national
governments, they can often develop standards more quickly and
efficiently than formal, public ICT SDOs. 69
Although consortia may not be formally recognized under
international law as a source of technical standards, 70 what they
lack in formal legal status, they often make up for in market
power. 71 This will be true if consortia standards define networks

abstract= 901324; Carl Cargill, The Informal Versus the Formal Standards
Development Process: Myth and Reality, in STANDARDIZATION ESSENTIALS:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 257 (Steven M. Spivak & F. Cecil Brenner eds.,
2001).
69
GREG FITZPATRICK, THE FAILURE OF EUROPEAN ICT STANDARDS POLICY
AND A POSSIBLE FUTURE (2003), available at http://www.itkommissionen.se/
doc/650.html.
70
The status of standards issued by formal international SDOs such as ISO,
IEC and ITU comes in part from the recognition that their adoption as national
standards provides countries with a defense to claims brought under the WTO
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. See generally Scott Kennedy, The
Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining China’s Involvement in
High-Tech Standards Wars, 2 ASIA POL’Y 41 (2006).
71
In principle, ISO does not work directly with consortia. It normally
reissues national standards submitted by national standard setting bodies (e.g.,
ANSI, the British Standards Institute, Association Française de
Normalisation (AFNOR), Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN), Japanese
Standards Association, etc.) as international standards, or develops international
standards. However, ISO does maintain two back doors—a “fast track” process
and a “publicly available submission” process—that under certain circumstances
permit consortia to submit standards directly to ISO for review without first
getting them adopted by a national standards body.
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characterized by strong “network effects.” 72 Network effects are
created when strong positive and negative externalities drive
consumers to use only one network, which may give the network
operator a dominant market position as well as de facto regulatory
authority over network participants. 73 Markets operating within
ICT networks may also be characterized as “multi-sided
platforms.” 74 The operator of a platform market may contribute to
the success of the platform by setting prices to attract certain
participants to it. Such a strategy consists of imposing high prices
on those who have the most interest in the success of the platform,
and low prices to those who have the least interest. Classic
examples of such pricing strategies include the use of advertising
revenues to subsidize the purchase of newspapers by consumers, or
selling a video game console at cost, and then setting the price to
end users of computer games high enough to subsidize the
development of new games.
If a global platform for mobile remittances emerges, and its
operators enjoy significant market power based on strong network
effects, then national regulators could find themselves under
pressure from their own citizens clambering to enjoy its positive
network effects to give such a platform local market access. If a
global network operator has enough market power, it may be able
to resist pressure to bear the cost of “localizing” its services to
comply with regulations in each national market it enters. Under
such circumstances, national regulators may be forced to choose
between granting citizens access to a global network and
exercising their authority in their national markets. This issue has
already emerged in global electronic payment services with regard
to the authority of global card payment services companies such as
Visa and MasterCard to control the terms and conditions under
72

See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES
(1999).
73
Jane K. Winn, Technical Standards as Data Protection Regulation, in
REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 191 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118542.
74
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided
Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003); DAVID S. EVANS, ANDREI HAGIU &
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, INVISIBLE ENGINES: HOW SOFTWARE PLATFORMS
DRIVE INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES (2006).
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which their services are supplied in different countries around the
world. 75
IV. GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY COMPETITION
Regulatory competition refers to competition among different
sovereigns for mobile economic resources such as labor and capital
by offering different regulatory regimes to attract them. 76 “Race to
the bottom” regulatory competition strategies generally involve
regulatory regimes that externalize the costs of attracting mobile
economic resources onto someone other than the owner of the
resource either inside or outside of a sovereign’s territory. For
example, using weak labor and environmental protection laws to
attract foreign investment may externalize some production costs
onto workers and citizens affected by pollution within that country
while allowing foreign investors to enjoy increased profits as a
result of lower nominal production costs. “Race to the top” or the
“California effect” is the opposite strategy: a sovereign with
market power can require producers to internalize more production
costs than other sovereigns do. California used this strategy
successfully when it required the use of catalytic converters on all
cars sold in California. When other sovereigns followed
California’s example, then producers that had adapted to the
stricter California standard had a competitive advantage over
producers that had not yet done so. The analysis of regulatory
competition becomes even more complex when national
governments are competing with non-state and hybrid regulators

75

China recently suffered a setback in its national strategy of limiting Visa
and MasterCard’s access to domestic Chinese markets for electronic payment
services by promoting a domestic competitor known as UnionPay. Panel Report,
China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R
(July 16, 2012). The Indian government may have more luck with its effort
known as RuPay to disintermediate Visa and MasterCard in the Indian domestic
payment market. Rupay Card Launched in India, RUPAY CARD (Sept. 30, 2011,
7:24
AM),
http://www.rupaycard.info/2011/09/rupay-card-launched-inindia.html.
76
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956).
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whose scope of authority is ambiguous and whose regulatory tools
are different. 77
With regard to a global network for mobile remittances,
regulatory competition could arise among both developed and
developing countries to shape the governance framework for
mobile money networks. In addition to network externalities and
the economics of platform markets, regulatory competition in
global markets is shaped by the interaction of nation states with
new private global governance institutions by a new trend:
[T]he delegation of regulatory authority from
governments to a single international private-sector
body that, for its area of expertise, is viewed by
both public and private actors as the obvious forum
for global regulation. In that particular issue area,
such a private body is what [Büthe and Mattli] refer
to as the focal institution for global rulemaking.
This
simultaneous
privatization
and
internationalization of governance is driven, in part,
by governments’ lack of requisite technical
expertise, financial resources, or flexibility to deal
expeditiously with ever more complex and urgent
regulatory tasks. 78
The FATF is clearly a “focal institution of global rule-making” for
financial integrity, while the Society for World-Wide Interbank
Telecommunications (SWIFT) is a focal institution for global
remittances executed by banks. It is unclear now what institution,
if any, will emerge as the focal institution for the emerging global
mobile remittance network.
In the information technology field, the question of what kind
of “focal institution of global rule-making” should govern the
Internet remains a matter of considerable and persistent
international controversy. The current focal institutions for the
77

Burkard Eberlein, Kenneth W. Abbott, Julia Black, Errol Meidinger &
Stepan
Wood,
Transnational
Business
Governance
Interactions:
Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE
(forthcoming 2013).
78
BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 18, at 5.
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Internet include the IETF and W3C, which are informal
collaborative networks of individuals and organizations, and the
Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a
California non-profit corporation backed by the U.S. government.
While many citizens and governments in LMEs support the
management of the Internet by IETF, W3C and ICANN precisely
because they are private, many citizens and governments in many
CMEs (as well as authoritarian societies) believe strongly that the
ITU as a formal, public and international SDO should govern the
Internet instead. 79
In specific ICT markets, either conventional SDOs or consortia
may play the role of focal institutions. The Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is a conventional SDO, the
modern successor to electrical industry SDOs going back to the
nineteenth century. The IEEE is accredited by the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), which means that it complies
with the due process requirements contained in ANSI Essential
Requirements. 80 The IEEE developed the IEEE 802 family of local
area network standards for wireless communications that includes
technologies marketed to the public as Wi-Fi. After the IEEE
802.11 standard was developed, however, promotion of the Wi-Fi
concept was turned over to the Wi-Fi Alliance, a consortium which
is not ANSI accredited. The Wi-Fi Alliance manages the use of the
Wi-Fi trademark and logo, and certifies that products are compliant
with the standard, in addition to developing new standards in
response to changing market conditions. The Wi-Fi Alliance has
two classes of voting members: a small group of “sponsor
members” with more authority over decision making, and “regular
members.” It also has affiliate members with limited voting rights
79

Geoff Houston, ICANN, the ITU, WSIS, and Internet Governance, 8
INTERNET PROTOCOL J., Mar. 2005, at 15-28, available at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_81/internet_governance.html.
80
AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS (2012),
available
at
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%
20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20a
nd%20Forms/2012%20ANSI%20Essential%20Requirements%20and%20other
%20Updated%20Procedures/2012_ANSI_Essential_Requirements.pdf.
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and adopter members without voting rights. 81 The Bluetooth
Special Interest Group (SIG) develops standards for short-range,
low-cost wireless communication technology for use with mobile
devices and also promotes the adoption of the technology. Even
though the Bluetooth SIG generally maintains open, transparent
processes, it also maintains different classes of membership, and
restricts admission: individuals are not allowed to join at all, and
control over the most important management decisions is retained
by seven “promoter” companies (Ericsson, Intel, Lenovo,
Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, and Toshiba). 82 GS1 is the most
important international radio frequency identification (RFID)
SDO, and is considered to be a consortium. 83 It is the successor to
the Uniform Code Council and EAN International, the
organizations that promoted the use of barcode technology since
the 1970s. It has affiliated organizations in over 100 countries, and
participation in GS1 activities is managed through the local
affiliates. The GSM Association (GSMA), the main SDO and
industry association for mobile telephone services around the
world, is also a consortium. 84 Full membership in the GSMA is
limited to wireless network operators, and other businesses in one

81

Bylaws of the Wi-Fi Alliance, WI-FI ALLIANCE (Jan. 2012),
http://www.wi-fi.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/WFA_Bylaws_
20120106.pdf.
82
SIG Membership Introduction, BLUETOOTH SIG MEMBER SITE,
http://www.bluetooth.org/apps/content/?doc_id=44513 (last visited Dec. 15,
2012).
83
ICT Standards Consortia, EUR. COMM. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.cen.eu/cen/sectors/sectors/isss/consortia/pages/default.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 5, 2013). In 2003, GS1 formed EPCglobal, a global membership
organization that works to promote the adoption of “electronic product codes”
and RFID technology. EPCglobal develops standards, provides conformity
certification for products, accredits other organizations to provide conformity
testing, and provides training, marketing and political advocacy for RFID
products and services. Electronic Product Code (EPC): An Overview, GS1 (Jan.
2007), http://www.gs1.org/docs/epcglobal/an_overview_of_EPC.pdf.
84
Standard Setting Organizations and Standards List: Telecom,
CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG, http://www.consortiuminfo.org/links/linkscats.php?ID
=26 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).

224

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:3

of four categories are eligible to join as associate members, but
individuals cannot join. 85
The whole idea of an ICT standards consortium originated in
the United States, so it is not surprising that the official U.S.
Standard Strategy treats the work of ICT consortia as equivalent to
the work of formal SDOs. 86 This openness to treating consortia
and formal public SDOs as equivalent is generally limited to
LMEs, however. Until very recently, European regulators have
been hostile to the idea of recognizing standards developed by
consortia in legislation or public procurement, preferring instead to
rely on international standards issued by formal public SDOs such
as ISO or ITU, or standards developed by formal European
SDOs. 87 European regulators have justified their reluctance to
embrace consortia standards by noting the success of the European
CME approach to ICT standardization in the case of GSM
technology. 88 Since the success of GSM, however, there have not
been many major successes for the European CME model of ICT
standardization in global markets, making it more difficult for EU
regulators to avoid working with consortia standards. In 2011, the
Commission announced its intention to permit reference to
consortia standards in EU regulations and public procurement,
provided that the processes by which those standards were
85

Types of Membership, GSMA, http://www.gsma.com/membership/typesof-membership/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
86
AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., UNITED STATES STANDARD STRATEGY 3
(3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/nss/
usss.aspx (“Global standardization goals are achieved in the United States
through sector-specific activities and through alliances and processes provided
by companies, associations, standards developing organizations, consortia, and
collaborative projects.”).
87
European formal SDOs are very similar in structure to international
formal SDOs: the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), which
corresponds to ISO, the European Committee for Electrotechnical
Standardization (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) which correspond to the ITU; cooperation between CEN and
ISO is governed by the Vienna Agreement and cooperation between CENELEC
and IEC is governed by the Dresden agreement. See generally Winn, supra note
20.
88
Jacques Pelkmans, The GSM Standard: Explaining a Success Story, 8 J.
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 432 (2001).
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developed meet European due process standards:
The selected ICT standards will complement
European standards and must comply with quality
criteria. Those criteria, which address both the
standards developing processes and the standards
themselves, cover matters such as openness,
transparency and neutrality as well as imposing the
same minimum requirements as applied by the
ESOs for the treatment of intellectual property (IP)
rights. 89
The EU quality criteria for consortia due process come from the
Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and
Application of Standards, Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade. 90
The European Union is clearly engaged in a “race to the top”
regulatory competition strategy with regard to recognition of
consortia ICT standards. While critics of its standards strategy
might view the United States as engaged in a “race to the bottom”
by permitting ICT consortia to pursue market opportunities
unencumbered by social regulations, supporters of the U.S.
approach would characterize it as “bottom up” (i.e., populist rather
than “top down” or bureaucratic) and market-driven. 91 European
regulators are calculating they can use access to the European
Internal Market for leverage in their regulatory competition with
the United States to influence the character of the global
information economy. If this strategy is not successful, then the
89

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: A Strategic Vision
for European Standards: Moving Forward to Enhance and Accelerate the
Sustainable Growth of the European Economy by 2020, at 16, COM (2011) 311
final (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0311:FIN:EN:PDF.
90
Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations
adopted by the Committee Since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev.8 (May 23,
2000), available at http://www.astm.org/GLOBAL/images/wto.pdf (including
decisions of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International
Standards, Guides, and Recommendations).
91
See generally Winn, supra note 73.

226

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:3

architecture of the global information economy will continue to be
dominated by U.S. standards policy.
If the emerging global mobile remittance architecture becomes
a platform market as well as a network supported by strong
network effects, then regulators in developed and developing
CMEs may find it difficult to exercise regulatory authority over its
operation within their borders. This is because the private operator
of a successful ICT-based platform has considerable discretion
with regard to the terms and conditions of access to the platform
market, and the prices of services offered through the platform. 92
Once a platform based on global ICT networks takes root within a
domestic economy, regulators may find it difficult (although not
impossible) to mandate changes in the way the platform operates. 93
A market-driven globally interoperable mobile remittance
network is already emerging. Visa and GSMA are partnering with
financial institutions, mobile network operators, handset
manufacturers, technology service providers, and industry
associations around the world to build that global architecture. 94
Because this effort is being spearheaded by the private company
that administers the largest proprietary payment card network in
the world, 95 and a private ICT consortium, its roots are clearly in
the LME environment. This is not the only source of standards for
mobile remittances, however. For example, the Government of
India is actively promoting the development of a domestic Indian
mobile payments architecture based on open standards. 96 If the
92

See generally EVANS ET AL., supra note 74.
DAVID S. EVANS, INTERCHANGE FEES: THE ECONOMICS AND
REGULATION OF WHAT MERCHANTS PAY FOR CARDS vi (2011), available at
http://origin.library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/11027673908311382/Interchange-Fees-web-2.pdf (noting that the United States, European
Union, and Australia have all taken action in recent years to force credit card
networks to change their pricing policies).
94
Bruce Burke, Towards a Global, Interoperable Mobile Money Network,
MOBILEPAYMENTSTODAY.COM (July 22, 2011), http://www.mobilepayments
today.com/blog/6013/Towards-a-global-interoperable-mobile-money-network.
95
Panel Report, supra note 75, at § 7.39 (“[I]t is the [Electronic Payment
Service] provider’s intellectual property that enables the switching of the
transaction and supports the electronic payment process, the transaction is
governed by the EPS provider’s rules and procedures . . . .”).
96
Indian Banks Collaborate on Merchant Payments Platform, GTNEWS
93
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Indian CME approach to standardizing mobile payments is
successful within the Indian domestic market, it might appeal to
regulators in other developing countries. 97
V. INTEGRITY BY DESIGN
For national regulators in developing countries who are
working to promote financial inclusion, significant challenges arise
in two broad areas of AML/CTF compliance: establishing identity
under agreed “know your customer” (KYC) or “customer due
diligence” (CDD) rules; and “suspicious transaction reporting”
under agreed protocols to detect suspect patterns of financial
transfers. 98 For developing countries such as China and Kenya that
had strong national identity systems in place long before
AML/CTF norms were even invented, it might be possible to use
ICT standards to rationalize KYC processes and make them more
efficient. For countries such as India that have never had a strong
national identity system, the Risk-Based Assessment approach in
the 2012 FATF Guidelines now permits national regulators and
mobile payment service providers to develop alternative KYC
protocols for which ICT standards may have little relevance. 99
(Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.gtnews.com/News/2012/Indian_Banks_Collaborate
_on_Merchant_Payments_Platform.html.
97
RADHA SOMAKUMAR & THOMAS MATHEW, MOBILE MONEY, FINANCIAL
INCLUSION, & FINANCIAL INTEGRITY CASE STUDY: INDIA (2012), available at
https://files.law.washington.edu/other/MobileMoney/.
98
Dittus & Klein, supra note 58.
99
For example, Reserve Bank of India KYC regulations permit someone
without any other identity documents to use a letter from a recognized public
authority or public servant verifying the identity and residence of the customer
in order to open a bank account. Master Circular – 'Know Your Customer'
(KYC) Guidelines – Anti Money Laundering Standards, RESERVE BANK OF
INDIA (July 1, 2009), http://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_CircularIndexDisplay.aspx
?Id=5083. India is currently building a national digital identity system. See
generally Planning Comm’n, Unique Identification Authority of India, UIDAI,
http://uidai.gov.in/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); see also Louis de Koker, Will
RICA’s Customer Identification Data Meet Anti-Money Laundering
Requirements and Facilitate the Development of Transformational Mobile
Banking in South Africa?: An Exploratory Note, CTR. FOR FIN. REGULATION &
INCLUSION
(Oct.
7,
2010),
http://www.cenfri.org/documents/
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Because national endowments with regard to identifying
citizens vary so widely across developing countries, ICT standards
may be more useful in lowering AML/CTF compliance costs if
they focus on “suspicious activity reporting.” Financial institutions
in developed countries already use sophisticated analytics on large
databases of transactional information to detect patterns of
behavior that might indicate money laundering. 100
Historically, advanced analytics have been used,
among other things, to analyze large data sets in
order to find patterns that can help isolate key
variables to build predictive models for decisionmaking. Companies use advanced analytics with
data mining to optimize their customer
relationships; law enforcement agencies use
advanced analytics to combat criminal activity from
terrorism to tax evasion to identify theft. Naturally,
these methods have their limits; for example, data
mining in search of new patterns in counterterrorism may yield little value. 101
If data formats and analytics for suspicious activity reporting
related to mobile payments could be standardized, that might
reduce barriers to the use of those same technologies in developing
countries. Just as falling prices of telephone switching equipment
and handsets helped spark the mobile telephony revolution in
developing countries, falling prices for servers, processors, open
source database software designed to work with very large
databases, high bandwidth networks, cloud computing and other
flexible resource allocation arrangements might make it possible
Financial%20inclusion/2010/RICA%20impact%20on%20financial%20inclusion
_final.pdf.
100
John Beck & John Morton, How Banks Can Make the Most of Data, THE
BANKER (June 1, 2012), http://www.thebanker.com/Tech-Trading/Technology/
How-banks-can-make-the-most-of-data?ct=true (“Today, most banks are using
analytics very much on a departmental or a business unit basis, such as in their
credit risk, market risk or anti-money laundering capabilities.”).
101
Ann Cavoukian & Jeff Jonas, Privacy by Design in the Era of Big Data,
PRIVACY BY DESIGN, 5 (June 8, 2012), http://privacybydesign.ca/content/
uploads/2012/06/pbd-big_data.pdf.
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for managers and regulators in developing countries to enjoy at
least some of the benefits of “Big Data.” 102 Increasing the use of
data analytics among mobile money service providers might be
one strategy to help regulators and service providers in developing
countries take full advantage of the flexibility offered with the
Risk-Based Approach in the 2012 FATF Guidelines. However,
because even sophisticated business enterprises in developed
countries find it difficult to extract the full value of “Big Data,”103
it is clear that regulators and service providers in developing
countries would require not just ICT standards but also
considerable technical assistance in order to deploy similar
technologies effectively under more difficult circumstances.
Current best practices in the development of information
technology indicate that factors like privacy and security, or by
analogy, financial integrity, should be treated as requirements from
the beginning of the design process in order to be effective. Ann
Cavoukian, Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, coined the
term “Privacy by Design” to describe a rigorous, proactive
approach to information privacy. 104 The concept includes early
mitigation of privacy concerns when developing information
technologies and systems, as well as continued focus on privacy
concerns throughout the entire information life cycle. The notion
of Privacy by Design was always consistent with EU data
protection law principles, and has now been embraced by EU
regulators as a key element of their approach to thinking about the
design of information technology and privacy. 105 The U.S. Federal
Trade Commission has now incorporated the idea into its

102

Dan Briody, Big Data: Harnessing a Game-Changing Asset, SAS (Sept.
2011), http://www.sas.com/resources/asset/SAS_BigData_final.pdf.
103
Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management
Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2012, at 60 (to reap the rewards of big data
analytics will require changes in leadership, talent management, technology,
decision-making processes, and company culture).
104
CAVOUKIAN, supra note 27.
105
Viviane Reding, Vice-President, European Comm’n, Speech at the
Round-table High Level Conference on Mobilising the Cloud, Privacy in the
Cloud: Data Protection and Security in Cloud Computing (Dec. 7, 2011),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-859_en.htm.
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information privacy strategy as well. 106 Alan Paller, of the SANS
Institute, makes a similar point about computer security generally
when he argues that security only works if it is “baked in,” rather
than being “bolted on” after a product has been completed. 107
Support for this “end-to-end” approach to privacy and security is
growing among some leading information technology companies,
and has been incorporated into their product development
processes, although this change in attitude in the private sector is
far from universal. 108
Recent attempts by the global payment card industry to
upgrade security on its existing network provide a cautionary tale
of how difficult and controversial the process of retrofitting
privacy and security technologies can be. In 2004, the global credit
card industry launched the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI DSS) as a joint industry effort to respond to
pressure from regulators in countries with strong data protection
laws about the security of personal information in their systems,
and to reduce the costs associated with large data breaches
involving the loss of consumer payment card information by retail
merchants. The PCI DSS standards are intended to establish a
mandatory minimum level of security for retail merchants
processing consumer card data, and range from basic common
sense (do not use vendor-supplied default passwords) and modern
risk management best practices (maintain a written security policy
and regularly test security), to very specific requirements (use a
firewall, issue a unique ID to each person accessing the system).
Early versions of the PCI DSS standard were widely criticized by
retail merchants as expensive and ineffective, and for having been
developed by the credit card networks and banks without adequate
consultation with the retail merchants expected to implement
them. 109 Even after the PCI DSS standard-setting process was
106

FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS
(2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/03/privacyframework.shtm.
107
Alan Paller, Cisco Wins National Cybersecurity Innovation Award,
SANS (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.sans.org/press/cisco-wins-ncia.php.
108
Rubinstein, supra note 27.
109
Michael Garry, PCI Seeks Retailer Feedback, SUPERMARKET NEWS (July
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opened up to greater participation by all stakeholders, and the
investment of many years of effort in implementation, independent
surveys suggest widespread non-compliance with PCI DSS
standards persists even in developed countries. 110 Litigation in the
United States has even called the legality of the scheme into
question: when an American bank exercised its right under the
scheme to fine a merchant for its alleged failure to comply with the
standard, the merchant filed suit against the bank, highlighting the
lack of accountability and transparency in the administration of the
PCI DSS standards, and the bank’s failure to prove that the
security breach had originated with the merchant in the first
place. 111
While embracing the notion of “Integrity by Design” for the
development of a global mobile remittance architecture might
reduce the risks associated with trying to “bolt on” financial
integrity functions after the network is already operational, such an
effort would also introduce new risks. Whenever the requirements
for standards are expressed too broadly, or incorporate too many
politically contested factors, then the odds that the resulting
standards will be widely adopted usually decline unless adoption is
mandated by a regulator. At present, there is no global regulator
capable of mandating compliance with ICT technical standards for
mobile remittances that incorporate financial integrity
requirements. If the adoption of ICT technical standards for global
6, 2009), http://supermarketnews.com/retail-amp-financial/pci-seeks-retailerfeedback.
110
Mathew J. Schwartz, 67% Of Companies Fail Credit Card Security
(April
20,
201),
Compliance,
INFORMATIONWEEK
http://www.informationweek.com/security/management/67-of-companies-failcredit-card-securit/229401946 (“PCI may have an image problem. According to
the study, 50% of security professionals view PCI as a burden, and 59% don't
think it helps them improve security. Furthermore, comparing this study with the
inaugural one conducted in 2009, the number of respondents who said they had
sufficient resources to comply with PCI dropped from 40% to 38%.”); John
Leyden, Firms Are RUBBISH at Payment Security: One in Five Bothered to
Meet Standards, THE REGISTER (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2011/09/29/pci_compliance_survey/.
111
Kim Zetter, Rare Legal Fight Takes On Credit Card Company Security
Standards and Fines, WIRED.COM (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2012/01/pci-lawsuit.
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mobile remittances is left up to the market and individual national
regulators, then the more narrowly such technical standards focus
on market demand, the greater their chance of widespread
adoption.
Developed countries are only now starting to try to incorporate
social requirements like privacy and security into the design of ICT
networks from the beginning. 112 Trying to incorporate social
requirements like financial inclusion and financial integrity into
ICT technical standards for global mobile remittances in order to
achieve “Integrity by Design” in developing countries might be an
even more challenging task than trying to achieve “Privacy by
Design” in developed countries, and would be undertaken with
even fewer resources. Because market conditions in developing
countries may be more diverse and complex than market
conditions in developed countries, merely developing ICT
technical standards for interoperability may prove difficult, and
adding AML/CFT compliance obligations to the scope of the
standard-setting activity might doom it to failure.
VI. CO-REGULATION FOR GLOBAL MARKETS
In Europe, when the work of legislatures and standard-setting
organizations is formally and explicitly coordinated, the resulting
process is known as “co-regulation.” In the United States, similar
processes are more likely to be referred to as “self-regulation.”113
112

For example, the EU General Data Protection Regulation proposed in
2012 would mandate “data protection by design and by default” in the
processing of personal information, which has been controversial. Commission
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation),
COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf.
113
The delegation of U.S. federal securities regulation authority to “selfregulatory organizations” such as the New York Stock Exchange or National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) is a clear example of this. JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 185-86 (3d ed. 2003)
(1939 decision to delegate regulatory powers to NASD because of skepticism
about government competence to regulate many aspects of the securities
market).
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However, because economic “self-regulation” even in LMEs takes
place in the context of continuous dialogue between the state and
private-sector actors, and involves at least some degree of implicit
or explicit delegation of state authority, the term “co-regulation”
could apply to what is referred to as “self-regulation” in the United
States, but would often be more accurate. For this reason, the term
“co-regulation” as used in this Article should be understood as
including most of what is referred to as self-regulation in LMEs.
Since the rise of the modern industrial standards movement in
Western nations in the late nineteenth century, 114 governments of
economically developed countries have developed some kind of
administrative “interface” between the institutions that develop
technical standards and the formal, public legal order, including
courts and legislatures. As in other areas of economic regulation,
the LME countries tend to favor an ad hoc piecemeal approach to
coordinating legislation with relevant technical standards, while
CME countries tend to favor a formal, systematic approach. 115 The
diversity of co-regulation approaches in the United States is a
reflection of the diversity of standard-setting organizations that are
recognized under U.S. law. 116 For example, although the official
U.S. Standards Strategy largely consists of letting the private
sector lead, 117 some standards are issued as mandatory government
regulations, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s standard
for what constitutes “milk.” 118 Private-sector standards normally
114

See generally SAMUEL KRISLOV, HOW NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT
STANDARDS AND STANDARDS CHANGE NATIONS (1997). The rise of the modern
industrial standards movement corresponds to the “second industrial revolution”
that began in the mid-19th century and continued through the early 20th century.
See generally JOEL MOKYR, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1870–1914
(1998),
available
at
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jmokyr/
castronovo.pdf.
115
See generally Tate, supra note 64.
116
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-TCT-512, GLOBAL
STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 14 (1992), available at
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9220.pdf.
117
AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., UNITED STATES STANDARD STRATEGY 5
(3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/nss/
usss.aspx.
118
7 C.F.R. § 1000.15 (2012) (“[F]luid milk product means any milk
products containing less than 9 percent butterfat intended to be used as
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function only as voluntary guidelines for compliance with
government regulations, but may be converted into mandatory
regulations by government action. 119 For example, when the
Consumer Product Safety Commission decided to set mandatory
minimum safety standards for children’s markers, it simply reissued the voluntary, consensus standard already adopted by
industry as a mandatory regulation. 120 The National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 directs U.S. government
agencies to use standards developed by voluntary consensus bodies
whenever available in lieu of government-developed standards to
accomplish its regulatory and administrative objectives. For
example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has a program
that permits private-sector parties to request “safe harbor” status
for voluntary private regulations, permitting them to be cited in
applications for pre-market approval for medical devices in lieu of
government standards. 121
The situation in most European countries, by contrast, is much
simpler because most national technical standards are set by a
national standards body that works closely with government
economic planning departments, as well as with the European

beverages.”).
119
See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Codes Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir.
2002).
120
A private industry association, the Arts & Creative Materials Institute,
began developing voluntary safety standards for the children’s art market in the
1940s; one of their standards was later taken up by the D01.57 Subcommittee of
the D01 Technical Committee of the American Society for Testing and
Materials (an ANSI accredited SDO) and issued as ASTM D-4236 in 1983,
before being adopted by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission under
the 1988 Labeling of Hazardous Art Materials Act as a mandatory safety
regulation for markers in the U.S. market and codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1500.14(b)
(2012).
121
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration maintains a database of all
voluntary, consensus standards that it has designated as equivalent to
government standards; private parties are free to reference them in market
approval applications but are not required to do so. Guidance for Industry and
FDA Staff – Recognition and Use of Consensus Standards, FED. TRADE
COMM’N
(Sept.
17,
2007),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm077274.htm.
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standards organizations: CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. 122 At the
European Union level, a very successful co-regulatory framework
known as the “New Approach” to standardization was developed
in the 1980s to promote the Internal Market by reducing technical
barriers to trade among member states. 123 The New Approach was
devised to end the gridlock that had characterized efforts to
harmonize technical standards in the Internal Market in the
1970s. 124 That old approach favored mandatory harmonization to a
single standard, maximizing the problems of transition from many
existing national standards to a single new European standard, thus
fueling opposition from almost all stakeholders every step of the
way. The New Approach required one of the European standards
bodies to develop a standard that created a voluntary “safe harbor”
for products that were certified compliant with it, permitting any
producer who wanted to continue using national standards without
the presumption of compliance to do so. The scope of the reference
standard also only covered “essential requirements.” Each New
Approach standard was developed to support a Directive, and the
link between the technical standard and the legislation was
established by publishing notices in the Official Journal rather than
re-issuing the technical standard itself as legislation. The result was
a loose coupling of traditional legislative processes with voluntary,
consensus technical standard-setting processes that made it easier
to accommodate technological innovation and also reduced
statutory obsolescence caused by mandatory regulations based on
standards that had become outdated.
The economies in countries where mobile money as a financial
inclusion strategy is likely to have the most impact in terms of
economic development are predominantly rural and agricultural so
links between the state and modern technical standard-setting
122

See generally European Standards Organizations (ESOs), CENELEC,
http://www.cenelec.eu/aboutcenelec/whoweare/europeanpartners/index.html
(last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
123
Council Directive 83/189/EEC, Laying Down a Procedure for the
Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations,
1983 O.J. (L 109) 8 (EC), amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 217) 18 (EC).
124
MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS,
REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE (2002).
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institutions will normally be weak or simply non-existent. Some
developing countries have developed an interface between
government and technical standard-developing institutions,
however, and in those countries, there is some evidence that the
familiar LME versus CME distinction can be observed. In the case
of M-Pesa, Kenya (a developing LME) pursued a more flexible, ad
hoc market-oriented approach. 125 By contrast, in India (a
developing CME) the central government has set a national open
standards strategy in addition to financial inclusion and financial
integrity strategies, and is working on a national mobile payment
interoperability standard as part of its strategy of modernizing its
payment systems generally.
More recently, another “co-regulatory” framework emerged in
the European Union within which technical standards and
legislation are even more loosely coupled. 126 The “Single Euro
Payment Area” (SEPA) is the name applied to a public-private
initiative in Europe to make the market for cross-border Euro
transfers more efficient. When the Euro was launched in 1999, the
bank clearing and settlement systems of different Eurozone
member states were not interoperable because each country relied
on separate legacy computer systems. Before the launch of the
Euro, the banks had used the lack of technical interoperability as a
justification to charge high fees for cross-border electronic funds
transfers (EFTs). After the launch of the Euro, the Commission
tried unsuccessfully to persuade the banks to lower their crossborder fees for Euro transfers. The banks resisted because merely
adopting a new currency would not suddenly make their computer
systems interoperable, so their actual costs for processing crossborder Euro transfers remained high. The Commission responded
by issuing Regulation 2560/2001 prohibiting banks in the
Eurozone from charging higher fees for cross-border Euro EFTs
than for domestic Euro EFTs. 127 As a result, because domestic EFT
125

Buku & Meredith, supra note 6.
Agnieszka Janczuk, Legislative Development: The Single Payments Area
in Europe, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 321, 335 (2010) (“[O]ne could characterize it as
a scheme of co-regulation . . . .”).
127
Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 2560/2001, Cross-Border
Payments in Euro, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 13, subsequently updated as Parliament
126
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fees were generally very low, or in some countries had even been
set at zero to encourage customers to stop paying by check, banks
in the Eurozone began losing money on all cross-border Euro
transfers.
In 2002, the major Eurozone banks responded by forming the
European Payment Council, an industry trade association and
standard-setting organization. Its membership structure is similar
to that of an ICT consortium: membership is voluntary, but
restricted to banks and European banking industry associations. 128
The EPC’s mission is to promote and support SEPA, 129 and so it
maintains a close dialogue not only with its member banks, but
also with EU regulators. To solve the cross-border interoperability
problem, the EPC develops “schemes” that combine technical
engineering specifications with harmonized business processes. 130
The SEPA Credit Transfer and Direct Debit schemes include ICT
interoperability standards within the ISO 20022 framework as well
as business process rules. In addition, EU banks are required to
provide their customers with bank account numbers in the
“International Bank Account Number” format for use with crossborder Euro transfers. 131
The EPC originally set up informal “councils” to solicit input
from non-bank stakeholder groups such as end users, but they
produced mixed results. While the SEPA Credit Transfer scheme
and Council Regulation (EC) 924/2009, Cross-Border Payments in the
Community, at recital 5, 2009 O.J. (L 266) 11.
128
Charter of the European Payments Council, EUR. PAYMENTS COUNCIL, §
7.1 (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/knowledge
_bank_detail.cfm?documents_id=337.
129
Id. at § 2.
130
What Is a Payment Scheme. EUR. PAYMENTS COUNCIL,
http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/content.cfm?page=what_is_a_payment
_scheme_sepa_customers (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
131
Article 37 of the PSD states that European bank customers must be
provided with unique identifiers for beneficiaries of cross-border Euro transfers.
Parliament and Council Directive 2007/64/EC, Payment Services in the Internal
Market, 2007 O.J. (L 319). The “unique identifier” used in SEPA is the IBAN,
which is based on ISO 13616-1:2007 Financial services - International bank
account number (IBAN). Payments Market Practice Grp., White Paper on Use
of IBAN in International Payments, SWIFT (June 2011), http://www.swift.com/
resources/documents/PMPG_IBAN_Whitepaper_July_2011.pdf.
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proved to be relatively uncontroversial, harmonizing business
practices for direct debits from customer accounts proved to be
very controversial. 132 Users who felt excluded from EPC processes
for drafting schemes and dissatisfied with the design of the SEPA
direct debit scheme complained to the Commission that the EPC
was not open and transparent. In 2009, the Commission
summarized the governance challenges facing the EPC in the
following terms:
The EPC has made progress in balancing the
interests of different stakeholders, but it must
operate in a more open manner to avoid possible
foreclosure effects and take into account the
interests of all stakeholders, including non-banking
stakeholders, payment institutions and users.
Greater transparency, adequate time for consultation
and early involvement of all stakeholders, in
particular users, in the planning and design of future
initiatives need to be ensured. 133
The SEPA Council was launched in 2010 with the mandate of
promoting the implementation of the SEPA system and also
ensuring accountability and transparency in SEPA governance
process. It meets twice a year, and is co-chaired by representatives
of the European Commission and European Central Bank. The
SEPA Council members include five representatives from the user
side of the market (consumers, retailers, businesses, and national
authorities); five representatives from the supplier side (European
Payments Council, cooperative banks, savings banks, commercial
banks, and payment institutions); and four national central bank
board members (representing the Eurosystem). 134 The EPC now
engages in extensive consultation with external stakeholder groups
132

EU Direct Debit Rules Open to Fraud, Says Consumer Group,
EURACTIVE.COM (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/payments/eu-directdebit-rules-open-fraud-news-223371.
133
Commission Communication, Completing SEPA: A Roadmap for 20092012, COM(2009) 471 final (Sept. 10, 2009) (emphasis added).
134
SEPA Council, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
payments/sepa/council_en.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
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before finalizing or amending schemes. 135
At the same time that the Commission and external
stakeholders were growing frustrated with the EPC’s governance
system, the EPC was growing frustrated with the Commission’s
reluctance to support the work of the EPC with the full weight of
EU legislation. The original vision for SEPA was that use of
legacy national EFT systems would end and that all Euro transfers,
domestic or cross-border, would be based on EPC standards; but
without any statutory mandate, domestic Euro transfers were not
being converted to the new formats. For example, the SEPA Credit
Transfer Scheme was launched in 2007 with great fanfare, but by
2011, only 22.6 percent of all Euro transfers were made using it.136
Recognizing that progress in building SEPA had stalled, the EU
Council and Parliament declared the need for a legislated “SEPA
end date” to accelerate the migration process. 137 The Commission
responded, however, with a proposal to open up to competition the
process of setting SEPA standards, without a firm commitment to
an end date. 138 Although the Commission tried to characterize the
135

See, e.g., Javier Santamaría, EPC Plenary Meeting Update, EPC NEWSL.
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at
47,
available
at
http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/pdf/EPC_Newsletter_300712_15.pdf
(At the EPC Member Plenary Meeting in June 2012, “It was decided that prior
to continuing work to finalise the new optional SDD Fixed Amount Scheme, the
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Committee (EUC) – in particular the BEUC (Bureau Européen des Unions de
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Council chaired by the European Commission (the Commission) and the
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users as well as the ECB and the Commission.”).
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Council Conclusions on SEPA, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION (Dec. 2,
2009),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ecofin/111670.pdf; Parliament Resolution 2010/C 349 E/09 of 10 March 2010
on the Implementation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), 2010 O.J. (C
349).
138
Internal Market and Services DG, Working Paper on SEPA Migration
End-Date EUR. COMM’N (June 2, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
payments/docs/sepa/end-date_migration_en.pdf. (If Commission remains
“neutral” with regard to specific standards, and only mandates “essential
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development of EPC standards as a “market-driven” process that
should be subject to competition, EPC members understood that
SEPA schemes were public goods constructed by private
enterprises at their own expense in furtherance of the
Commission’s goal of building the Internal Market:
SEPA was not started as a demand-driven process,
but as a policy-maker-driven EU integration
initiative. The political SEPA vision aims to
generate macro-economic benefits, strengthen the
euro currency, drive forward the integration of the
internal market and accelerate technological
innovation in payments and beyond. In other words,
SEPA is supposed to promote the public interest of
European citizens at large. The current [low] rate of
SEPA market uptake therefore, is perfectly in line
with the progress of any other major EU integration
initiative promoting a good that is not assumed to
produce immediate benefits, requires initial
investment to be realised and lacks clear regulatory
direction. The European Commission itself
recognises that full migration to SEPA would take
some thirty years if projected based on market
uptake to date. Consequently, the majority of
stakeholders recognise that deadlines for SEPA
migration must be set through EU legislation. 139
The low voluntary adoption rates for SEPA schemes clearly
demonstrated that the SEPA project was not market-driven, and
without decisive intervention by a regulator, it would simply fail to
achieve its original goals. In 2012, the Commission issued the
SEPA End-Date Regulation, setting February 1, 2014 as the
deadline for phasing out the use of old national Euro transfer
requirements” for SEPA migration, then it might be possible for a new SEPA
standard setting process to be organized to compete with EPC).
139
Gerard Hartsink, So What’s in a Name? Explaining Payment Schemes,
Instruments and Systems, EPC NEWSL (Eur. Payments Council), Oct. 2010, at 1,
available at http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/pdf/EPC_Newsletter_
251010_8.pdf .
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schemes and full migration to the new EPC SEPA Credit Transfer
and Direct Debit Schemes. 140
Between market pressure for reform created by the original
Regulation 2560/2001 and a statutory end-date established in 2012,
together with the creation of the SEPA Council, the EPC and the
Commission ended up in something close to the “New Approach”
co-regulatory framework. The process looked more like LME
informality than CME organization, however. With regard to the
possibility of combining harmonized AML/CFT compliance
business processes with ICT technical interoperability standards
into something like “schemes” for a global mobile remittance
network, the SEPA experience suggests that some degree of
coercion by a central regulator would be necessary, and that the
process of building and fine-tuning the “interface” between
political institutions, markets and SDOs would be complex.
A global mobile remittance network will require some kind of
co-regulatory interface, and the competition has already begun
among developed and developing countries with both LME and
CME orientations to take a leadership role in building that
interface. Developed and developing countries that already have
standards strategies in place are most likely to emerge as leaders in
that process, while developing countries without national standards
strategies will be unable to contribute much without a great deal of
technical assistance. From the perspective of legitimacy, however,
regulators and consumers in less developed countries may be
essential stakeholders even though they currently lack the capacity
to participate actively or directly in the creation of governance
institutions. The inability of billions of global mobile remittance
network stakeholders in developing countries to participate in the
early stages of standard setting should give rise to concern about
possible “foreclosure effects.”
What would a co-regulatory framework that promotes dialogue
between FATF and private ICT SDOs, and minimizes the risk of
foreclosure effects for the least developed countries look like? It
might include some of the following elements:
140

Parliament and Council Regulation 260/2012, Establishing Technical and
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Amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009, 2012 O.J. (L 94/22).
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Representatives of each standard-setting organization might
be sent to observe each other’s meetings.



Technical assistance might be provided to representatives
of less developed countries to permit them to participate as
observers in private ICT SDO activities relevant to global
mobile remittance standards.



A procedure might be established to determine whether
private standard-setting organizations developing global
mobile remittance standards relevant to AML/CTF
compliance processes meet the due process requirements
set out in the Code of Good Practice in Annex 3 to the
WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement.



Recognition of effective use of ICT standards to enhance
compliance might be highlighted in FATF Mutual
Evaluation Reports, building up a kind of precedent
system. 141



The FATF might issue guidance establishing a presumption
of compliance with regard to specific issues when
compliance with certain “schemes” (incorporating both
business practice and ICT standards) has been certified by
an accredited independent third party.
CONCLUSION

Mobile money offers much greater promise than almost any
other development strategy to emerge since the modern study of
development began after World War II. 142 An operational global
mobile remittance network would have an impact on the payment
systems in any country that is either a source of poor economic
141
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migrants or a target destination for them. No such network exists
today, but, spearheaded by Visa and the GSM Association, a
technical standards architecture for one is already emerging. The
development of such a global architecture could promote financial
inclusion without regard to national boundaries. The challenges
facing EU regulators in creating a “Single Euro Payment Area”
illustrate clearly the problems that might arise if developing
countries each build their own mobile money systems and, only
after they are complete, attempt to make them interoperable.
A global mobile remittance architecture might also provide an
opportunity to integrate financial integrity functions into the
operation of the network. If developing country regulatory
requirements could be addressed in the same ICT standards that
constitute the network, then the real cost to developing countries of
AML/CFT compliance might fall with the growth of global mobile
money networks. In such a case, expansion of the network would
simultaneously enhance both financial inclusion and financial
integrity goals. The challenges facing the card networks trying to
increase security at the retail point-of-sale with the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard illustrate clearly the risks of trying
to “bolt on” compliance functions rather than “baking them in”
from the beginning.
In recent decades, regulatory competition in many global ICT
markets has been intense as countries try to push the development
of technical standards in a direction that is compatible with their
existing institutions. So it should not be surprising if regulatory
competition emerges to set standards for a global mobile
remittance market. The standard-setting activities that are already
underway are within the “liberal market economy” tradition, and
without external pressure from national regulators or international
regulators with market clout, are unlikely to internalize any costs
of AML/CTF compliance. They are also more likely to be
dominated by private parties and to rely on proprietary
technologies. By contrast, “coordinated market economy”
regulators are more likely to embrace open standards. They are
also more likely adopt policies like “privacy by design” that
require private parties to internalize significant social regulation
costs in the development of products and standards. If developed
and developing CME countries supported an “integrity by design”
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approach in standard setting, then AML/CTF compliance costs in
developing countries pursing mobile money financial inclusion
strategies might fall.
A common reason that technical standard-setting efforts fail,
however, is that the problems the standard-setting process tried to
address were “over-constrained” or became too political. 143 Within
the LME approach to ICT standard setting, it is often possible to
keep a tight focus on meeting market demand as quickly and
effectively as possible. Because financial integrity is a regulatory
obligation imposed on financial service providers, it is unlikely
that financial integrity functions would be incorporated into LME
market-driven standards in the absence of a clear regulatory
mandate. The FATF, as the focal institution for global AML/CTF
regulations, does not yet appear to have focused on ICT standards
as a mechanism for reducing compliance burdens, let alone to have
considered issuing such a mandate. Should it choose to focus on
ICT schemes that combine technical interoperability standards and
harmonized business process standards as a policy mechanism,
then ICT governance issues would immediately surface. At that
point, careful analysis of some of the co-regulatory mechanisms
already in use in the United States and European Union might help
frame governance issues related to regulatory effectiveness and
legitimacy for global mobile money networks.
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The IETF addresses both problems simultaneously with its “rough
consensus and running code” standard. If rough consensus is not possible, i.e.,
the problem is too political, it is not undertaken. If there is not more than one
successful implementation of the standard, i.e., running code, then the standard
is not issued. More political organizations such as ISO and the ITU do not have
the luxury of simply refusing to work on projects or failing to complete them.
As a result, their portfolios are replete with standards with no known adoptions.

